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S.: Husband and Wife, Domicile of Wife
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

regard to contracts for the sale of land. It has once been expressed
'31
as a contrivance "to improve gentlemen out of their estates.
Had the Statute been rigorously enforced the result would have
been different. "Few instances of parol agreements would have
occurred, whereas it is manifest that the decisions on the subject
have opened a new door to fraud." It is useless, however, to
bewail the laxity that has prevailed in the enforcement of the
Statute which has allowed the doctrine of part performance to
spring up that has so firmly become rooted in the courts of equity.
Our best way out is to require more rigid acts of part performance-acts that approach the irreparable.
-A. P.

HuSBAND Aim WIFE, Doicmn op WFm.--The question of when
and under what circumstances a wife may acquire a domicile
different from that of her husband is becoming more important
in the courts of this country. With the so-called "rise of women's
rights," noted in the enabling statutes passed in practically all
jurisdictions, and in the present tendency towards more equality of
treatment by the law, it seems that the conditions under which a
wife can acquire a different domicile may be worth consideration.
It is the general principle of the common law that a married
woman merges her legal entity in that of the husband, and upon
marriage she acquires his domicile,1 which changes with every
alteration of his, regardless of the actual locality of her residence.'
The common law theory was that the very being or legal existence
of the wife was suspended during marriage,3 that a person under
authority of another has no right to choose a domicile.4 This is the
rule in England at the present time. The fact that a wife actually
lives apart from her husband, that they have separated by agreement,' that the husband may have been guilty of such misconduct
as would furnish a defense to a suit by him for restoration of
conjugal rights,7 does not enable a wife to acquire a separate domim Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & L. 5 (1804).
1

MNo , CONPL. LAws, 46.

Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 706 (1883) ; Watkins v. Watkins, 135 Mass. 83,
858 (1883).
s
1

BL.
Co. 442.
STORY, CON-L. LAwS, 48.
Warrender, 2 CI. and F. 488 (1835).
' Warrender vP.
6 Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390 (1859) ; In re. MAackenzie, (1911) 1 Cha. 578.
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 1 Sw. and Tr. 574 (1859) ; Dolphin v. Robins; Note 6,
supra.
'
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cile. Though a wife may acquire a separate lome for herself,8
she can under no circumstances have any legal home or domicile
9
other than that of her husband.
But in this country, the old common law rule has not been followed in all its strictness. The ancient unity has become dissevered,
and the theory of the wife's servitude has been superseded by
the theory of equality as to property, torts, contracts and civil
rights.'
If this statement be broad enough to include among civil
rights the power to acquire a domicile different from that of the
husband, the next inquiry is as to the circumstances which must
necessarily be present before the wife can establish her separate
domicile. An eminent tribunal has said that she may acquire a
separate domicile whenever it is right and proper that she should
do so." It is to be noted that the first departure from the strict
common law rule is the view that a deserted woman may bring suit
in the state of matrimonial domicile where she remains,' 2 as her
domicile does not follow that of her husband in that case.' 8 This
view is sometimes known as the Massachusetts rule.
But other states are more liberal. In a recent Virginia case,
Humphreys v. Humpreys,14 the husband had been guilty of cruelty
sufficient to warrant a divorce under the statute.' The wife went
to Reno, established a residence, and secured a divorce. The husband in Virginia started a suit for divorce on the ground that the
Nevada decree was null and void. Hed, the wife could acquire
a domicile ;n another state separate from that of her husband for
the purpose of getting a divorce.'8
If it were possible here to give a categorically accurate review
of the cases, the decision under consideration would be in accord
with the position of numerous other jurisdictions. There are
many cases to the effect that where a wife has grounds for divorce,
she may remove to another jurisdiction, and establish a separate
domicile.' 7 So where the hubsand has been guilty of desertion,' 8
5

Italics Ours.
Dic= AND K=iTH, CONFL. LAWS, 3RD. ED., pp. 135-7.

10 Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 36 Atl. 282 (1893).

2 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869) ; see also Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y.
217.
.1 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. B. 192 (1908), affirming Judgment
in 108 N. Y. S. 534, 123 App. Div. 754.
13 Perkins v. Perkins,1225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841, (1916) ; Burtis v. Burtis, 161
Mass. 508, 37 N. E. 740 (1894) ; Hartigan vo. Hartlgan, 14 Pick. 181, 25 Am. Dec.
372 (Mass. 1833).
"1 123 S. E. 554 (Va. 1924.)
15 Va. Code, 1919, 5104.
20 Note 14, supra.
17 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
I Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va., 146, 73 S. E. 310 (1911) ; Petty v. Petty, 42 Ind.
App. 443, 85 N. E. 995 (1908) ; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. . 87 (1856) ; Moffatt v. Moffat, 5 Cal. 280. (1855). See also Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181, 112 S. E.
316 (1922).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol31/iss1/8

2

S.: Husband and Wife, Domicile of Wife
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

cruelty, 9 or barbarous treatment, 20 habitual intemperance,21 or
adultery, 22 this rule will apply, for the purpose of allowing the
Wife to sue for divorce. Viewed as an extension of this position
is a third treatment of the problem, the view that there is "no
reason why a wife who has justifiably left her husband should not
have the same choice of domicile for an action for damages that
she has against her husband for a divorce. 22 A fourth position
is adhered to in at least two jurisdictions, in which a wife can
acquire a separate domicile, even though she have no grounds for
divorce23 so that her estate may be administered at the place of
her death, despite the fact that the husband's domicile is in another
jurisdiction. 4 The theory in these cases is that the separation is
2
just as effectual as if a judicial decree had directed it. ,
Regardless of the fact that the present tendency of the courts
seems to be toward a more liberal interpretation of the principles
governing the domicile of the wife, yet there are cogent reasons
against the further extension of the Humphreys case. The effect
of such policies on the American home might be far from salutary.
As long as the husband is the head of the family and is under the
duty to support the wife,2 6 and is liable for her torts,27 it seems
more logical that he should be allowed to pick the jurisdiction in
which he will be held responsible for these duties.
-H. L. S. Jr.

PRoMOTERS-WHAT ARE SECRET PROFiTS--DuTY OF Paomo0ERs
TO DISCLOSE PROFITS&-When one undertakes to promote a corporation, it frequently happens that he wishes to convey his own
property to the corporation. Under proper circumstances, such a
conveyance is perfectly legitimate. But very frequently the transaction is not entirely free from suspicion of unjust profits or actual
fraud. A case arose where a promoter had ecured an option on

10

Hill v. Hill, 166 Ill. 54, 46 N. E. 751 (1897).
D Hollister i. Hollister, 6 Pa. St. 449 (1847).
Sawtell v. Sawtell, 17 Conn. 284 (1845).
S
Kinnier V. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 536, 6 Am. R.132.
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619 (1914).
:' Schute v. Sargent, Note 10 supra; Saperstone v. Saperstone, 131 N. Y. S. 241,
146 App. Div. 576 (1911) ; Lyon v. Lyon, 30 Hun. 455 (N. Y. 1883). Contra, Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694 (1899) ; Cheely v. Clayton, Note 2, supra; Loker v. Gerald,
157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709 (1892).
Matter of Florence, 54 Hun. 328 (N. Y. 1888).
In re Crosby's Estate, 148 N. Y. S. 1045, 85 Misc. N. Y. 679 (1914).
Keller v. James, 63 W. Va. 139. 59 S. E. 939 (1907).
Anderson v. Davis, 55 W. Va. 429, 47 S. E. 157, (1905) ; Bogess v. Rtichards,
39 W. Va. 567, 673. 20 S. E. 599, 603 (1894).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1924

3

